Recently, Herranz presented an identity-based ring signature scheme featuring signer verifiability where a signer can prove that he or she is the real signer by releasing an authorship proof. In this paper we show that this scheme is vulnerable to a key recovery attack in which a user's secret signing key can be efficiently recovered through the use of two known ring signatures and their corresponding authorship proofs. In addition, we present a simple method to fix this security vulnerability by slightly modifying the authorship proof. Our modified scheme simplifies the original scheme and improves performance. To show that the modified scheme is unforgeable, we define two types of unforgeability notions for both signatures and authorship proofs. In these notions an adversary has opening capability to confirm the real signers of ring signatures and thus can manipulate authorship proofs in an adaptive way. We then prove that our modified scheme is secure in terms of these unforgeability notions.
Introduction
To achieve both signer ambiguity and message authentication properly for applications treating user-sensitive information, ring signature (RS) schemes have been constructed [8, 3] . Using a list or a ring of arbitrary signers, a signer can compute a signature associated with the ring and hide himself or herself in the ring. From a valid RS, a verifier can be convinced that the signature is generated by one of the ring members, but cannot be aware of the exact signer. An identitybased RS (IBRS) scheme is an RS scheme combined with identity-based cryptography [10] , where (certificate-based) public key management procedures are simplified such that an arbitrary public string such as an e-mail address may be used as a public verification key [11] .
While it is desirable that a signer remains anonymous for some applications, the signer needs to prove origination of a signature in times of acquiring benefits, or as otherwise necessary. For example, consider the case of an online auction. A participant may use an IBRS scheme for anonymity but will need to convince a verifier that he or she really submitted the winning bid or contract price. By releasing an authorship proof of a ring signature, IBRS schemes can achieve convertibility or signer verifiability [9, 6 ] that a signer can convert his or her ring signature into an ordinary signature. The authorship proof explicitly guarantees the identity of the real signer. For convenience an IBRS scheme with signer verifiability is called an SV-IBRS scheme throughout the rest of this paper.
An SV-IBRS scheme must achieve basic security notions, such as existential unforgeability and robustness to key recovery attacks, so that only the members of a ring can generate valid signatures associated with the ring. These security notions should be achieved under reasonable attack environments. In order to prove and confirm a real signer, an SV-IBRS scheme makes use of two additional algorithms, opening and convincing. Basically, the scheme must guarantee that no useful information leaks out when using these algorithms. Furthermore, it should be impossible for colluding adversaries to deceive a verifier regarding the origination of a signature with a forged authorship proof. * Tel.: +82 18 741 9526. Recently, a novel SV-IBRS scheme extending the Guillou-Quisquater signature scheme [2] was proposed and a formal security proof for the scheme was presented in [3] . In contrast to other works which presents only intuitive solutions and informal security analysis [5, 6] , [3] presents a formal treatment for secure opening and convincing algorithms of a ring signature scheme. Unfortunately, in this paper, we show that the SV-IBRS scheme is vulnerable to a key recovery attack; that is, the secret signing key of a user can be efficiently computed by using two known ring signatures and their corresponding authorship proofs. To remedy this security problem, we slightly modify the original IBRS scheme by removing one element in the original authorship proof. The modified SV-IBRS scheme becomes simpler than the original scheme and offers improved computation overhead.
In order to show that our modified scheme is unforgeable, we first formally define two types of unforgeability notions for an SV-IBRS scheme. Intuitively, the first notion captures normal existential unforgeability of a ring signature and the second captures unforgeability of an authorship proof. For the second notion we consider two kinds of forgers. The first kind of forger aims to forge both a signature and its corresponding authorship proof for a target signer without knowledge of the private key of the signer. The second kind of forger possesses the private key of the real signer and tries to forge an authorship proof for a given signature. Once unforgeability against the second kind of forger is achieved, all signatures generated with a private key remain anonymous even under exposure of the private key. In the security notions described above, an adversary is allowed to access the opening oracle to obtain an authorship proof of a ring signature and confirm the real signer of the ring signature in an adaptive way. Obviously, because of the opening property, the security notions of an SV-IBRS scheme are intrinsically different from those of an ordinary IBRS. We prove that our modified scheme is secure in terms of these two unforgeability notions.
Organization. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we review the recently proposed IBRS scheme with signer verifiability [3] . In Section 3 we show that the scheme is vulnerable to a key recovery attack. In Section 4 we first propose a simple modification to fix the security problem, and then define two unforgeability notions. Finally we prove that the modified scheme is secure with respect to these notions. We conclude in Section 5.
A review of Herranz's SV-IBRS scheme
We will briefly review the SV-IBRS scheme from [3] . Let φ(·) be Euler's totient function, that is, φ(N) = (p 1 − 1)
r , where r, k 1 , . . . , k r are positive integers and p 1 , . . . , p r are distinct primes.
Setup:
On input of a security parameter k, the master entity generates two random k-bit prime numbers p and q, and computes N = pq. For some fixed parameter ℓ, the master entity picks at random a prime e satisfying 2 ℓ < e < 2 ℓ+1 and gcd(e, φ(N)) = 1, and computes d = e −1 mod φ(N) where φ(N) = (p − 1)(q − 1). In addition, the master entity picks two hash functions H 1 : {0, 1} * → Z * N and H 2 : {0, 1} * → {0, 1}
ℓ . The set of public system parameters is params = (k, ℓ, N, e, H 1 , H 2 ) and its corresponding master secret key is msk = (p, q, d).
Extract: When a user with identity ID ∈ {0, 1} * requests a secret key, the master entity computes SK = H 1 (ID) d mod N. The secret key SK is sent to the user through a secure channel. The user then verifies if the received secret key is consistent by checking if SK e = H 1 (ID) mod N.
Ring Signature Generation:
To sign a message M ∈ {0, 1} * on behalf of a ring of identities, U = {ID 1 , . . . , ID n }, a user with identity ID s ∈ U and secret key SK s proceeds as follows:
Ring Signature Verification: For the validity of a signature, check if
Output 1 if all the equalities hold, and 0 otherwise.
Opening:
Assume that a signer with identity ID s has correctly followed the Ring Signature Generation algorithm to generate a ring signature Θ = (U, 
Vulnerabilities in the SV-IBRS scheme
In this section we show that the above scheme is vulnerable to a key recovery attack; that is, a secret signing key of a signer can be easily computed using two known ring signatures and their corresponding authorship proofs. Additionally, we discuss why this security problem occurs.
A key recovery attack on the scheme
In our attack scenario, we assume that an adversary F randomly selects a target identity ID, and two rings 
respectively. Note that this is a typical and practical attack environment in which to measure the security of a signature scheme. Let the given valid signatures and their corresponding authorship proofs be
By assumption, the signatures and the proofs have correct forms, that is,
Using the extended Euclidean algorithm, the adversary finds two integers α 1 and α 2 such that h s 1 α 1 +h
(mod N), and then
Now we compute the probability that the adversary succeeds in the presented attack. It is well known [7] that the probability that two random numbers are relatively prime is 6/π 2 ≈ 0.6. We can apply this fact to our case. Due to the random hash function H 2 , we can assume that h s 1 
) are distributed uniformly at random, and so h s 1 and h ′ s 2 are relatively prime with probability 6/π 2 ≈ 0.6. Therefore we can expect that the adversary will find two integers α 1 , α 2 such that h s 1 α 1 + h ′ s 2 α 2 = 1, and thus will compute the secret key
(mod N) within two trials with high probability.
Discussion
The main idea of the above key recovery attack is to make use of ring signatures and their corresponding authorship proofs. This attack is reasonable because a signer will release authorship proofs of ring signatures whenever he proves the real signer of the signatures, and an adversary may easily obtain these authorship proofs. Neither the unforgeability model nor the security proof of the model in [3] considers this malicious use of authorship proofs. In order to reflect an adversary's capabilities precisely and guarantee sufficient robustness under publicity of authorship proofs, the unforgeability model must include opening oracle queries which provide an adversary with authorship proofs.
The security proofs of the SV-IBRS scheme presented in [3] are not correct in the unforgeability model with the opening oracle queries. The opening algorithm of the SV-IBRS scheme outputs an authorship proof cv-pf = {A, {A 1 , . . .
. . , h n , σ ) if this signature Θ was generated by ID s ∈ U = {ID 1 , . . . , ID n }. Refer to Section 2 for more details. Thus, the authorship proof must include A such that A e ?
It is intractable to simulate this opening algorithm in the security proofs (described in [3] ), because the simulation of signature generation is performed without knowledge of A and so a response to an opening query, that is, an authorship proof cannot include A. So the original opening and convincing algorithms must be properly modified.
Modification
To resolve the previous security problem one may use an idea from [8, 9] where the A i 's, which are generated for nonsigners of a ring for a ring signature, are set to be hash outputs of H 2 and a collection of pre-images of the hash outputs are used for an authorship proof. In this section, instead of using the idea, we slightly modify the original Herranz's SV-IBRS scheme not only to fix this security problem but also to improve performance.
Construction
The modified SV-IBRS scheme is described as follows.
Setup, Extract, Ring Signature Generation, and Ring Signature Verification algorithms are the same as those of Herranz's scheme described in Section 2.
Opening: Assume that a signer with identity ID s has honestly followed the Ring Signature Generation algorithm to generate a ring signature Θ = (U, M, R 1 , . . . , R n , h 1 , . . . , h n , σ ). When the signer wants to reveal his or her identity as the real signer of the signature, he or she broadcasts the identity ID s and a convincing authorship proof cv-pf = (s,
Convincing: A verifier confirms the validity of the authorship of a given signature
Note that the modified Opening and Convincing algorithms are simpler than those of the original scheme. Since the modified Opening algorithm outputs only an index, instead of a group element A, to indicate a real signer, the modified authorship proof is shorter by almost one element of Z * N . Furthermore, the modified Convincing algorithm does not perform the equality test, A e ?
Next, we prove that the modified scheme is secure, despite this simplification.
Unforgeability properties for an SV-IBRS scheme
To prove that the modified scheme is unforgeable, we first formally define two kinds of unforgeability notions for an SV-IBRS scheme where an adversary is able to access the opening oracle. The first notion is unforgeability of a ring signature, that is, it should be computationally impossible for a malicious party who is not a member of a ring to generate a signature associated with the ring, even if opening capability is given to that party. This notion is simply referred to as unforgeability in this paper because it is similar to the standard notion of unforgeability for an ordinary IBRS scheme. The second notion captures unforgeability with respect to ''signer verifiability", i.e., unforgeability of an authorship proof. In order to treat the second notion more precisely, we consider two security requirements. 1 First, it must be computationally impossible for an adversary to generate both a signer's ring signature and its corresponding proof without knowing the private signing key of the signer. Second, it must be computationally impossible for an adversary to generate an authorship proof for a given ring signature even if the adversary is aware of the actual signing key. These notions are formally modeled in two games.
Unforgeability. An SV-IBRS scheme, Σ = (Setup, Extract, Ring Signature Generation, Ring Signature Verification, Opening, Convincing) is existentially unforgeable under the chosen message-identity attack if any probabilistic polynomialtime (PPT) adversary has a negligible advantage in the following game.
Initially, a challenger C sets up parameters running the Setup algorithm of Σ for a given security parameter. Public parameters params are given to an adversary F . The challenger provides the adversary with an attack environment using the following oracle queries.
Queries: The adversary F can make Extract, Ring-sign, Opening, and Hash oracle queries. The queries can be issued in an adaptive way, i.e., a query may depend on the answers to the previous queries.
• Extract ⟨ID⟩. The challenger runs the Extract algorithm to obtain a private key SK ID corresponding to ID and then returns SK ID .
• Ring-sign ⟨ID •
Assume that Θ ′ has been generated by a Ring-sign query. After running the Opening algorithm with the given signature Θ ′ and the message M ′ , the challenger then returns the resulting authorship proof cv-pf.
• Hash. If some hash functions, which are assumed to behave as random oracles [1] , are used in the security proof then the challenger returns consistent and totally random hash values.
Forgery: Finally, the adversary F outputs a tuple (U, M, Θ). We say that F succeeds if the following conditions hold.
-Θ is valid, that is, the Ring Signature Verification algorithm taking as input (params, U, M, Θ) outputs 1.
-For any ID i ∈ U, the identity ID i has not been queried to the Extract oracle.
-For any ID i ∈ U, the signature Θ has not been generated from querying ⟨ID i , U, M⟩ to Ring-sign oracle. Game SVU -I. Initially, a challenger C sets up parameters running the Setup of Σ for a given security parameter. Public parameters params are given to an adversary F I . The challenger provides the adversary with an attack environment using the following oracle queries.
Queries: The adversary F I makes Extract, Ring-sign, Opening, and Hash oracle queries. The queries can be issued in an adaptive way, i.e., a query may depend on the answers to the previous queries.
• Extract ⟨ID⟩. After running the Extract algorithm with ID, the challenger then returns the corresponding private key SK ID .
Assume that Θ ′ has been generated by a Ring-sign query. The challenger runs the Opening algorithm with the given signature Θ ′ and the given message M ′ , and then obtains an authorship proof cv-pf. The challenger returns the proof.
• Hash. If the scheme uses some hash function H, which is assumed to behave as a random oracle [1] in the security proof, then the challenger returns consistent and totally random hash values. Public parameters params are given to an adversary F II . We assume that all private keys are given to the adversary. The challenger provides the adversary with an attack environment using the following oracle queries.
Queries: The adversary F II makes Ring-sign, Opening, and Hash oracle queries. The queries can be issued in an adaptive way, i.e., a query may depend on the answers to the previous queries.
Assume that Θ ′ has been generated by a Ring-sign query. The challenger runs the Opening algorithm with the given signature Θ ′ and the given message M ′ as input, and then obtains an authorship proof cv-pf. The challenger returns the proof.
• Hash. If the scheme uses some hash function H, which is assumed to behave as a random oracle [1] 
Security proofs
Before presenting security proofs, we will review the RSA problem [3] on which the security of our modified scheme relies. Let N = pq, where p and q are two k-bit prime numbers. Let e be a random prime number such that the size of e is greater than 2 ℓ for some fixed parameter ℓ and gcd(e, φ(N)) = 1. Let y be a random element in Z * N . The RSA problem is to compute z satisfying z e = y (mod N) for given (N, e, y) . 
Hence, the Opening⟨U, M, Θ⟩ query can be correctly answered using A 1 , . . . , A s−1 , A s+1 , . . . , A n ′ which were picked in the signature simulation of the proof. So the simulation for Opening oracle queries can be easily done.
Theorem 2. The constructed SV-IBRS scheme above is existentially SV-unforgeable under the hardness of the RSA problem in the random oracle model.
This theorem can be directly proved from the following two lemmas.
Lemma 1. An adversary F I has a negligible advantage in the first game for SV-unforgeability in Section 4.2
Proof. In the security proof we will construct an efficient solver S to the RSA problem using an adversary F I who attacks the proposed SV-IBRS scheme as a sub-routine. Let (N, e, y) be an instance of the RSA problem. The goal of S is to compute z ∈ Z * N such that z e = y (mod N). The solver S will simulate an attack environment for the adversary through oracle queries. We assume that F I 's hash queries are never repeated. Let Q 1 , Q 2 , Q e , and Q s be the numbers of H 1 , H 2 , Extract, and Ring-sign queries issued by the adversary, respectively. We assume that all ring signatures queried to the Opening oracle are generated by the Ring-Sign oracle. Note that an adversary would already know the authorship proof of a ring signature if he or she generated the ring signature by himself using the private signing key of a corrupted user.
S responds to oracle queries as follows.
• Queries to the H 2 random hash oracle. These queries are trivially answered, that is, for an oracle query, pick c from {0, 1} ℓ uniformly at random and then return c.
• Queries to the H 1 random hash oracle. For an H 1 ⟨ID⟩ oracle query, H 1 (ID) is defined by yx e mod N with probability µ and x e mod N with probability 1 − µ, where µ = (5/6) 1/Q e and x is chosen from Z * N uniformly at random. For more details, refer to [3] . Return the defined H 1 (ID).
• Queries to the Extract oracle. For an Extract⟨ID⟩ query, if an answer to H 1 (ID) query has not been defined then ask an H 1 (ID) query. If H 1 (ID) = x e mod N for some x ∈ Z * N then return x. Otherwise, abort the simulation.
• Queries to the Ring-sign oracle. First, S picks α from {1, . . . , Q s } uniformly. For a Ring-sign ⟨ID, U, M⟩ query, proceed as follows. Assume that ID ∈ U = {ID 1 , . . . , ID n } and ID = ID s for some s ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Let Coin δ be a δ-biased coin which outputs 1 with probability δ and 0 with probability 1 − δ. Assume that δ = 1/2.
-On the αth query, toss -On the other queries, proceed as follows. 
(2) For identity ID with H 1 (ID) = x e mod N, using the corresponding private key x, generate a signature according to the correct signing procedure, and then return the signature.
• Queries to the Opening oracle. For an Opening ⟨ID, U, M, Θ⟩ query, proceed as follows. Assume that ID = ID s ∈ U = {ID 1 , . . . , ID n }.
-If Θ has been generated from the αth Ring-sign query with Coin δ = 1 then abort.
-Otherwise, proceed as follows.
(1) For identity ID with H 1 (ID) = x e mod N, an answer can be obviously returned because Θ can be generated with the signing key x according to the defined signing procedure.
(2) For identity ID with H 1 (ID) = yx e mod N, return an authorship proof cv-pf = (s, A 1 , . . . , A s−1 , A s+1 , . . . , A n ) using A i 's (i = 1, . . . , n(i ̸ = s)) that are generated in the presented simulation of Ring-sign. The authorship proof is valid because A i ∈ Z * N with R i = A e i mod N is well defined in the simulation.
Assume that the adversary F I finally outputs (ID t , U, M, Θ, cv-pf) where ID t ∈ U = {ID 1 , . . . , ID t , . . . , ID n |n ≥ 2}, Θ = (U, M, R 1 , . . . , R n , h 1 , . . . , h n , σ ) ,
The above simulation is perfect if no abortion occurs. It is obvious that hash outputs are distributed uniformly at random.
If abortions are not considered, we can assume that the ID queried to the Extract oracle satisfies H 1 (ID) = x e for some x ∈ Z * N and so x is a valid secret signing key because
Next we show that all signatures generated from the Ring-sign oracle are valid. The signature returned from the αth query correctly passes the verification test because σ
Similarly, signatures returned from signature queries with H 1 (ID) = yx e mod N are valid because of the same reason above. For the other Ring-sign queries with H 1 (ID) = x e mod N, generated signatures are valid because the signatures are honestly generated with the signing key x which was picked by the simulator.
For the forgery output by F I , we have two possible cases: (1) The first case is that Θ is generated by a Ring-sign query.
(2) The second case is that the adversary generates Θ by himself or with corrupted users, without the help of a Ring-sign query. Next, for each case, we describe a method to solve the RSA problem and compute the success probability. In the following description, for simplicity, we assume that all the identities ID i that the adversary queried to the Extract oracle satisfy H(ID i ) = x e i (mod N). Using analysis similar to the proof of Theorem 4 in [3] we can show that this assumption holds with overwhelming probability.
• In the first case, if Coin δ = 1 and Θ is the same as the signature returned from the αth Ring-sign ⟨ID, U, M⟩ query then a solution to the given instance of the RSA problem can be computed as follows: if any ID i ̸ = ID s , ID t exists in the ring U then z = A By assumption, the probability of Coin δ = 1 is 1/2. The probability of the correct choice for α is at least 1/Q s because α is uniformly picked from {1, . . . , Q s }. Therefore, the probability that the simulator succeeds is at least
Note that no abortion occurs in the simulation of Opening oracle queries if the Θ that F I outputs is the same as the signature returned from the αth Ring-sign ⟨ID, U, M⟩ query.
• In the second case, if Coin δ = 0 then we can solve the RSA problem as follows. By assumption, Θ is valid and so we have σ 
Using the 'Forking Lemma' [4] (or 'Ring Forking Lemma' [3] ) technique, we can obtain another forgery (ID t , U, M,Θ, cv-pf) such that h j ̸ =ĥ j (j = 1, . . . , t − 1, t + 1, . . . , n) and h t ̸ =ĥ t , whereΘ = (U, M, R 1 , . . . , R n ,ĥ 1 , . . . ,ĥ n ,σ ) and Since the probability of Coin δ = 0 is 1/2 by assumption, the probability that the simulator succeeds in the above case is at least 1 2 .
Note that no abortion occurs in the simulation of Opening oracle queries if Coin δ = 0, because the simulator could responds with a valid authorship proof to any Opening query as presented in the simulation of the Opening oracle. Proof. We will construct an efficient algorithm S to solve the RSA problem using an adversary F II who attacks the proposed scheme in the second game of SV-unforgeability. Let (N, e, y) be an instance of the RSA problem. The goal of S is to compute z ∈ Z * N such that z e = y (mod N). The solver S will simulate an attack environment for the adversary through oracle queries. We assume that F II 's hash queries are never repeated. Let Q 1 , Q 2 , Q e , and Q s be the numbers of H 1 , H 2 , Extract, and Ring-sign queries issued by the adversary, respectively. We assume that all ring signatures to be queried to Opening oracle are generated by the Ring-sign oracle.
• Queries to the H 2 random hash oracle. These queries are trivially answered, that is, for an oracle query, pick c from {0, 1} ℓ uniformly at random, and then return c.
• Queries to H 1 random hash oracle. For an H 1 ⟨ID⟩ oracle query, pick x ∈ Z * N uniformly at random and compute v = • Queries to the Extract oracle. For an Extract⟨ID⟩ query, if an H 1 (ID) query has not been queried to the H 1 random hash oracle then ask an H 1 (ID) query. Find the private signing key x corresponding to H 1 (ID) = v = x e mod N and then return x.
• Queries to the Ring-sign oracle. When F makes a signature query for (ID, U, M), proceed as follows. Assume that ID ∈ U = {ID 1 , . . . , ID n }. Find the private signing key SK = x corresponding to H(ID) = x e mod N. Using the secret signing key, generate a signature according to the correct signing procedure and then return the signature.
• Queries to the Opening oracle. For any Opening query, a correct answer is returned because all signing keys are well defined and signatures are honestly generated according to the defined signing procedure with the signing keys.
When the adversary submits (M, U, ID ∈ U) as a challenge in the challenge phase, the simulator S returns a ring signature Θ as follows: let ID = ID s ∈ U = {ID 1 , . . . , ID n }. ID s and ID t , i. The given simulation is perfect because all signing keys are correctly generated by the simulator and distributed identically as in the proposed Extract algorithm. Hence, the success probability of the RSA-solver S is the same as that of the adversary F II . 
Conclusion
We have shown that the IBRS scheme with signer verifiability recently proposed by [3] is vulnerable to a key recovery attack. Additionally, we have presented a simple method to fix this security problem.
